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Abstract 
 
The scientific community has a sustained history of issuing warnings to society’s leaders and policy-makers. In such 
cases, scientists take on the task of alerting those in power to issues they may not notice or not wish to see. A 
distinctive thing about environmental warnings authored by leading scientists is that they are addressed to 
“humanity.” This paper argues that attempts to “speak truth to humanity”—despite the undoubted quality of the 
data and analyses—face three sorts of problem. There is firstly the difficulty that humanity is not a unified entity 
in the way that is often assumed and that, in practice, citizens may not be in a position to act in the way that is 
presupposed by those who issues the warnings. Secondly, though the declaration of a climate emergency may appear 
to be a desirable corollary of speaking truth to humanity, there are good reasons from political science to think that 
such declarations will be made for messier and complex reasons. Finally, even the more technical aspects of the 
warning documents may contain normative or social scientific components; they are not exclusively technical. 
Together these points argue for the engagement of humanities and socials sciences scholars in future attempts to 
offer compressive, integrated warnings to humankind. 
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The scientific community has a sustained history of issuing warnings to society’s 
leaders and to policy makers, whether over diseases and infections, the unintended 
consequences of nuclear war, inadequately controlled innovations, or environmental 
harms. In such cases, scientists are taking on the role of those who can speak truths to 
the powerful, alerting those in power to issues they may not notice or to things they 
would rather not see. Scientists’ ability to act in this way is usually said to arise from 
the fact that the academic scientific community is disinterested—that is free of vested 
interests—in relation to the matters under consideration, and that the community has 
mechanisms such as peer review, replication and (relatively) open publication that 
secure a high degree of robustness and impartiality for scientific claims (Yearley 2005, 
160–65). There is a large and engaging literature on this topic, but it tends to focus on 
those occasions when scientists advise governments and policy makers. A distinctive 
thing about the warnings issued by Kendall (1992) and by Ripple et al. (2017) is that 
they are addressed to “humanity.” This extension of the usual recipient seems to be 
driven by two considerations: first, that the problem is globally urgent so that action 
cannot be left to governments alone, and—second—that everyone has a stake and some 
form of involvement in the phenomena so that each of us can become part of the 
solution. In this paper I propose to examine, from a social scientific and humanities 
point of view, three aspects of issuing warnings from the scientific community to 
humanity.  
 
The Conception of the Audience 
The first point here is very clear to social sciences and humanities scholars but is none 
the less worth stating: it cannot be taken for granted that “humanity” has a unified 
outlook on global environmental problems. This is, in part, a relatively straightforward 
empirical observation. Some individuals may have lives that feel so intolerably 
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disadvantaged that they are not convinced that environmental change will truly make 
them worse. Everyday difficulties may simply outweigh the in-principle severity of 
environmental threats. Steps to reduce their environmental impacts may simply be too 
onerous for them. Alternatively, many religious believers will regard their current life as 
much less important than their fate after death, giving rise to less concern for 
environmental conditions than for one’s relationship to the Deity. This was, after all, 
the official Christian position for centuries. Believers will regard sacred obligations as 
more powerful than injunctions from scientists and may even construe environmental 
change as an aspect of a fundamentally religious reality.  
But one does not need to focus on extreme examples to identify problems with the 
way the audience is being imagined or understood. Clearly, in the wealthier parts of the 
world, individuals do have some of the kinds of freedom presupposed by the authors of 
the warnings. Consumers in Europe who are buying cars do have a choice, for example, 
between vehicles driven by fossil fuels or by electricity, and the environmentally less 
harmful choice would seem to be clear (though not having a car or carpooling would 
likely be yet more preferable). Even in this case, however, car-buyers do not necessarily 
have a choice about how the electricity they would use for their car is generated. This is 
the key point: the warnings imagine the actor as an independent, informed chooser who 
can select between options. However, as has been highlighted for example in the work 
of Shove (see 2003), there are significant areas of people’s lives where they are very 
limited in their ability to choose. In principle, for example, one could opt for a dwelling 
with very high environmental performance (in terms of insulation and heating/cooling, 
re-use of rainwater and forms of waste-water, and so on). In the USA and the UK and 
in parts of Continental Europe and widely within South America and South Asia, for 
example, this is simply not an available choice for the majority of citizens. Houses 
already exist and it is hard and expensive to retrofit them to comply with high 
environmental standards. Most consumers know little about the options and are 
dependent on architects and heating engineers to act for them in these matters. In 
practice citizens do not resemble the kind of autonomous actor implied in the 
warnings. These communications from scientific bodies may make people feel guilty 
about the choices embodied in their houses, but citizens may not be in a position to 
alter very much.  
There is one other key aspect of citizens’ lives that relates to these warnings: their 
reproductive behavior. There has recently been a good deal of popular discussion about 
the morality of having children. For example, in 2019 the Democratic, rising-star US 
Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez shared on Instagram her thoughts on 
whether it is acceptable to have children from a climate point of view.1 Ripple et al. 
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(2017) are clear that rising population levels are part of the problem that concerns 
them, just as they are worried by the rising numbers of ruminants. Certainly, moving 
away from ruminant-meat diets is something that individuals can opt to do and it fits 
the individual decision-maker model well, but the parallel with reproduction is 
troublesome. Limiting the right to bear children seems to have an unavoidable political 
dimension since it allows some within a society to reproduce while others are denied 
the chance (Crist 2020); it almost certainly has implications for the ethnic composition 
of populations. It seems tantamount to the political management of the make-up of the 
population. 
 
What Constitutes an Emergency? 
In Ripple et al.’s later paper (2020) they gave notice of a climate emergency. Clearly, 
calling for its designation as an emergency is designed to reflect deep seriousness and 
urgency—indeed Lenton et al. (2019, 595) explicitly define emergency as the 
mathematical “product of risk and urgency.” A very similar theme is famously 
associated with Greta Thunberg, who told the World Economic Forum in 2019 that it 
is as though “our house is on fire.” Her point was that, if people are not panicking, then 
that can only be because they have not understood how bad the problems are.  
All the same, the question remains about what exactly should follow from the 
problems being declared an emergency. One interesting trope here relates the current 
climate-change problem to war-time levels of urgency. If manufacturing economies can, 
at times of military threat, be transformed towards armaments or aircraft production, 
then why not take a similar approach to the climate threat? This line of thinking has 
been embraced by Australian environmentalist Paul Gilding who authored an opinion 
piece for Nature explaining “Why I Welcome a Climate Emergency” (Gilding 2019). He 
sees genuine acknowledgement of an emergency as offering to kick-start transformative 
economic, political, and industrial change. 
There are, however, grounds for caution here. On the other side, many policy 
makers (especially those of an economics bent) suggest that panic—as desired by 
Thunberg—is exactly to be avoided. Policy options adopted in haste are often 
ineffective or wasteful and may result in perverse outcomes. This is reported to have 
been the case with Europe’s flight from carbon, which led polluting industrial 
manufacture to relocate to East and South-East Asia, where it may well have provoked 
more CO2 emissions per ton of output than the original plant would have caused since 
energy inputs were more carbon intensive than they would have been in Europe (Helm 
2012, 67–71; 2017). Furthermore, there is an interesting party politics and international 
relations dimension to the willingness to declare a climate emergency. In many 
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countries, declaring a condition of emergency has particular implications in terms of 
freedom of action by the executive, or limitations on the customary rights or freedoms 
of citizens, or the authorities’ liberation from specific financial constraints. These issues 
became very clear in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, where citizens in France 
lacked liberté and had to print out written justifications for leaving the house during 
lockdown; and where even right-wing European governments were frantically 
borrowing and spending in a frankly left-wing manner. In the case of the climate 
emergency, it is unclear what specific legislation or powers would be introduced to 
handle the crisis and for how long. In some cases, politicians seem to have declared 
climate emergencies for relatively mundane or even tendentious political motivations. It 
is in danger of becoming a form of “virtue signaling” or an attempt by parliament to 
appear environmentally committed without necessarily undertaking much action to 
overcome the emergency. Countries declared climate emergencies to show that 
governments were engaged with the issue or, in some cases, to show that regional 
authorities were more responsive to citizen concerns and environmental needs than 
central governments (or vice versa). 
 
Humanities and Social-Science Aspects within the Scientists’ Warnings 
The scientists’ warnings are not only interesting for the audience they presuppose and 
for the political consequences which they postulate, but also for some sociological and 
philosophical aspects of the technical, scientific work itself. For example, in a recent 
social scientific study of the technical communities working on decarbonization 
pathways in the UK, it was found that technical experts differed in their assessments of 
which kinds of changes were necessary and practicable. Even within policy 
communities committed to decarbonization, there are competing visions: for example, 
between an emphasis on substituting current approaches (swapping electric or fuel-
cell cars for diesels) and a demand for radical socio-technical transformations, in this 
case away from private vehicle ownership (Winskel and Kattirtzi 2019). Among 
researchers working with essentially the same data, there are different conclusions, all 
of them claiming predominantly technical justifications.  
In a similar way there has been a lot of focus in discussions of recent IPCC 
publications on the role of “negative emissions” (see Anderson and Peters 2016). The 
IPCC has sought to provide projections into the future which show feasible pathways 
for large-scale emissions reductions and possibly even for carbon sequestration from 
the atmosphere—in other words, preventing future temperature rises by removing CO2 
from the atmosphere. These possibilities are shown among the range of future 
scenarios. To achieve a specific future temperature (within the 1.5o ambition, for 
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example), one can either begin to cut emissions drastically in the immediate future or 
allow small rises in the short term provided these are balanced by complete cuts and 
some CO2 removal later on (in two or three decades for example). Anderson and Peters 
raise objections to this approach since they point out that we do not currently have 
proven CO2-removal techniques at sufficient scale. They worry that scenarios which 
depend on “negative emissions” may amount to false assurances. Such techniques are 
technically imaginable, but whether they can be included in future pathways is not a 
matter of technical fact; rather it is a judgment. 
There is finally an issue about the way in which the whole discourse is shaped. In 
the last fifteen years or so, decarbonization has come to eclipse sustainable 
development as the overall policy framing. However, it is evident that ideas related to 
the circular economy are now being promoted by governments, industry bodies, and 
some research funders, notably in the EU and the UK as a major new frame. Key here 
are the ways in which these rival constructions may conflict. For example, a recent UK 
projection from the Committee on Climate Change (the government’s official 
independent climate advice body) anticipated electric vehicles displacing current road 
transport as a pivotal part of the UK’s decarbonization over the next ten to fifteen 
years. However, rival calculations from a materials and earth science background 
suggested that this ambition would place an insupportable demand on minerals needed 
for the batteries: Herrington (2019) calculated that just to supply the UK vehicle fleet’s 
batteries would consume the entire global cobalt production. Since most vehicles are 
only used for a fraction of the day on average, having the cobalt sitting unused most of 
the time could be seen as a misuse of cobalt stocks, an unnecessary exploitation of the 
mineral wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and of the energy needed to 
extract the metal in the first place. On this view, a change in the business model for 
vehicle provision (where the market is for “drives” or “rides” rather than for vehicles) is 
central, but this insight arises from focusing on circularization rather than on 
decarbonization per se. 
 
Concluding Discussion 
In this short paper, the key argument has been that attempts to “speak truth to 
humanity”—despite the undoubted quality of the analyses and the accuracy of 
underlying data—have faced three sorts of problem. There is firstly the difficulty that 
humanity is not a unified entity in the way that is often assumed and that, in practice, 
citizens may not be in a position to act in the way that is presupposed by those who 
issue the warnings. Secondly, the declaration of a climate emergency may appear to be a 
desirable corollary of speaking truth to humanity. But there are good reasons from 
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political science to think that such declarations may be made for messy and complex 
reasons, leading to inconsistent responses to emergency conditions. Finally, it was 
argued that even the more technical aspects of the warning documents may contain 
normative or social scientific components; despite their appearances, the warnings are 
not exclusively technical. Together these points argue strongly for the close 
engagement of humanities and social sciences scholars and investigators in future 
attempts to offer comprehensive, integrated warnings to humankind.
 
 
 
Notes 
1 On her post, see Matthew Taylor’s (2019) response titled “Is Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Right 
to Ask If the Climate Means We Should Have Fewer Children?” 
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